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FIFTH AMENDMENT-THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CUSTODIAL
CONFESSIONS
Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Minnick v. MississippiI the Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment protection of Edwards v. Arizona 2 prohibiting authorities from initiating questioning of the accused in counsel's absence,
is not terminated or suspended when an accused has consulted with
an attorney prior to questioning. Although extending Edwards, Min3
nick continues the ad hoc, often chaotic legacy of Miranda v. Arizona.
This Note examines the background of Miranda and Edwards.
After summarizing the facts of the case and the Court's opinion, this
Note discusses how Minnick v. Mississippi fits into the post-Miranda
caselaw. The final section of this Note includes: (a) an analysis of
the Court's weakening of the Miranda holding and resulting
problems; (b) a discussion of the differing practical and theoretical
perspectives of the Justices in Minnick, which echo the MirandaJustices' views; (c) an analysis of Minnick's failure to solve the problems
of Miranda and the Court's treatment of it; and (d) a proposal of a
new rule to solve the problems of Miranda and its legacy - inadmissibility of custodial confessions not made in the presence of counsel.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."4 The
Constitution further guarantees that in criminal proceedings the accused has the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 5 The Supreme Court's famous articulition of so-called
Miranda rights in Miranda v. Arizona 6 established procedures which
1
2
3
4
5
6

111 S. Ct. 486 (1990).
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cI.2.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 3.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ostensibly guarantee that police inform criminal suspects of these
constitutional provisions and ensure that police respect suspects'
rights.
Prior to Miranda, the Court articulated several tests for the admissibility of custodial confessions. In Hopt v. Utah the Court fashioned a "voluntariness test" under which confessions were
presumed voluntary if made without threats or inducements. 7 This
test focused on the suspect's state of mind and the trustworthiness
and believability of his statement rather than on the tactics of police
in eliciting the confession. 8 Later, the Court included police conduct as one of several factors to be considered in determining voluntariness. 9 In Brown v. Mississippi, the next step in its analysis of
voluntariness, the Court relied on the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to reverse a conviction where the
police had admitted to whipping and hanging defendants until they
confessed.' 0 This new due process test forced the Court to decide
whether confessions -were compelled, and thus inadmissible,
through ad hoc case-by-case analysis of police tactics.
After Brown v. Mississippi, the Court vacillated between focusing
on the reliability of confessions under the voluntariness test and ex7 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884). The Court stated:
[T]he presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions], namely, that one
who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue
statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements ... or because of a threat or promise ... operating upon the
fears or hopes of the accused. . .depriv[ing] him of that freedom of will or selfcontrol essential to make his confession voluntary....
Id.
8 For a full explanation of this test, see CharlesJ. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good
for the Soul?: A Proposalto Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1826, 1831 (1987).
9 In Ziang Sung Wan v. U.S., the Court concluded that "the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by promise or threat" but that if the facts show that a confession was obtained through
compulsion applied by police officers, such conduct makes the confession inadmissible.
266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924). In Brain v. U.S., the Court held:
The rule is not that, in order to render a statement admissible, the proof must be
adequate to establish that the particular communications contained in a statement
were voluntarily made, but... [that] the accused was not involuntarily impelled to
make a statement when but for the improper influences he would have remained
silent. With this understanding of the rule, we come to consideration of the authorities['] [actions].
168 U.S. 532, 549 (1897).
10 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The Court held:
The due process clause requires that state action ... be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions. It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to
the sense ofjustice than those taken to procure the confession of these petitioners,
and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process.
Id. at 286 (citation omitted).
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amining the circumstances of the interrogation under due process
standards.I 1 Under the due process test the Court attempted to define the process due to suspects and wanted the lower courts to
closely examine the record of an interrogation to decide whether
such process had been impaired.' 2 Eventually, the Court merged
these two tests, combining the voluntariness test's emphasis on
guarding against unreliable confessions and the due process standard's assessment of confession admitted in court proceedings.' 3
Yet this combined approach still had many of the problems of the
individual tests, such as lack of uniform application of factors to be
considered in the decision, little opportunity for the court to articulate clear standards of police conduct, and lack of clear guidelines
for lower courts to apply in deciding the admissibility of confessions. 14 Therefore, the Court had no definitive test of whether a
confession was compelled or voluntary. This confusion in application of various standards allowed, if not encouraged, police to engage in tactics on or beyond the edge of constitutional
permissibility, including physical and mental abuse of suspects.' 5
The Miranda Court' 6 attempted to end this confusion in the law
of admissibility of custodial confessions, by making three major rulings.1 7 First, the Court decided that informal pressures to speak can
11 Under its due process review the Court based its decisions on the premise that
"the public interest requires that interrogation .
at a police station, not completely
be forbidden, so long as it is conducted fairly .
State v. Smith, 161 A.2d 520, 537
(1960).
12 Note, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635, 662-63 (1966) (discussion of the Court's "difficulties in deciding just what process is due at interrogation,"
leaving lower courts without clear guidance as to what circumstances surrounding interrogation are relevant under due process analysis).
13 The merged "due process voluntariness standard has three possible goals: (1) ensuring that convictions are based on reliable evidence; (2) deterring improper police
conduct; or (3) assuring that a defendant's confession is the product of his free and
rational choice." Id. at 663-64.
14 Ogletree, supra note 8, at 1833-34.
15 See e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 240 (1941) (police officers engaged in
"lawless practices", but the defendant's collected attitude refuted the charge of involuntariness); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (reversed conviction based on confession because defendant was "overborne" by "sustained pressure by the police"); Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (reversed conviction of suspect "overborne by
... sympathy falsely aroused" by police acting as friend and misrepresenting facts to
encourage confession).
16 Chief'Justice Warren wrote for the five member majority withJustice Clark concurring and Justice Harlan and Justice White dissenting.
17 The Court summarized its three holdings, stating:
[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of
criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to
incriminate themselves. [W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compel-
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constitute compulsion under the Fifth Amendment.18 Informal
compulsion involves pressures apart from formal legal sanctions or
process. 19 Following closely from this definition of compulsion, the
Court also held that any custodial hearing no matter how brief will
involve enough pressure on'the suspect to speak to constitute compulsion. 20 By ruling that the nature of custody is compelling per se,
the Court attempted to end the arbitrariness and confusion in decisions under the voluntariness and reliability tests. The third and
most famous holding in Miranda is that the police must inform a
criminal suspect of his rights prior to questioning.2 ' The purpose of
these warnings was to "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
22
surroundings."
The Warren Court sought to protect suspects by requiring that
police read suspects their rights to remain silent and to speak with
counsel, thereby reducing the custodial pressures to confess and
giving police incentives not to actively pressure suspects.23 If the
police wish to admit into evidence at trial any statement made by the
suspect while in custody without counsel present, the State must
prove the suspect "knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel." 24 The Court applied the high standard of proof required
for the waiver of other constitutional rights to the waiver of Miranda
rights. The standard was articulated by the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst
as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege." 2 5 Unless the government can prove compliance with
the procedures required by the Court or meet the Zerbst burden of
ling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against selfincrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his rights
and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). For a full explanation of Miranda, see StephenJ. Schulhofer,
Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHIc. L. REv. 435 (1987).
18 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
19 Id.
20 Id.

The Court also held:
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means
are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
Id. at 444.
22 Id. at 458.
23 See Ogletree, supra note 8.
24 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (footnote omitted).
25 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
21
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proof standard, statements made by a suspect in custody are inadmissible as a matter of law. 2 6 Contrary to the due process voluntari-

ness standard, the Court refused to engage in a balancing test of the
needs of law enforcement authorities in investigating crimes and the
rights of suspects. 2 7 The Court explicitly rejected a case-by-case
analysis and held the warnings to be "fundamental with respect to
Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to
28
existing methods of interrogation.In a corollary to Miranda, the Court furthered its goal of protecting suspects from police coercion in Edwards v. Arizona. 2 9 In Edwards, the Court recognized the need for additional safeguards
against police compulsion when a suspect has requested counsel by
holding:
When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated
custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights ...
[A]n accused .. .having expressed his desire to deal with the police

only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
30
accused himself initiates further communication ...with the police.
The Edwards rule thus furthers the goal of Miranda by strengthening
the prohibition of coercive police tactics. One commentator has described the relationship of these two cases and their effort to control
police abuse of suspects as follows:
Miranda forces the police to tell suspects up front that they can stop
the questioning if they wish and can call on a lawyer if they need help.
Edwards in turn tells the police that they will pay a heavy price if the
suspect calls for help ...[T]his gives police a strong incentive to avoid
the kinds of tactics that are likely to lead suspects to seek a lawyer's
assistance, because those tactics will be counterproductive. 3 '
By giving the suspect the power to determine for himself under
what circumstances he needs the assistance of counsel, that is,
whether the police tactics used constitute abuse or not, the Edwards
rule both relieves the courts from making that determination and
discourages police from engaging in abusive tactics that will induce
26 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. The Court stated, "unless and until such warnings and
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against [the accused]." Id.
27 Ogletree, supra note 8, at 1838.
28 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.

29 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
30 Id. at 484-85.
31 William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 820-21

(1989).
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the accused to implement his right to counsel.3 2
Thus, together Miranda and Edwards effectively protect suspects
from the often severe physical abuse they received from police
before the decisions. 3 3 However, these decisions have also given
police incentives to use trickery and deceptive tactics to obtain confessions from defendants.3 4 When these non-abusive tactics cross
the line and become coercive making confessions inadmissible has
been the newest problem the Court must address. Also, the Court
must grapple with the issue of the validity of waivers of rights when
an accused is subjected to such psychological tactics. That is the
issue in Minnick v. Mississippi.
III.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner Robert Minnick along with a fellow inmate, James
Dyess, escaped from a county jail in Mississippi on April 25, 1986.35
The next day, Minnick and Dyess broke into a mobile home in an
attempt to steal weapons.3 6 While searching the trailer, the two
men were surprised by Ellis Thomas, the trailer's owner, and Lamar
Lafferty and Lafferty's young son.3 7 Minnick claimed that Dyess
killed one of the men and forced Minnick to kill the second.3 8 Two
women arrived at the trailer before Minnick and Dyess could flee the
scene.3 9 Minnick states that he convinced Dyess not to hurt the wo40
men, who they tied up and then fled.
32 Id. at 821.
33 See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (suspect kept in custody for

16 days of interrogation during which he lost 15 pounds); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568 (1961) (mentally deficient man interrogated for four nights and five days and
denied counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (mentally deficient ninteen year

old man held incommunicado for three days and told he would only be protected from
mob if he confessed); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (suspect held in small
hot room and subjected to night and day relay interrogation and threatened with arrest
of his mother); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940) (suspect confessed after several

beatings on nightly "trips to the woods" from the jail).
34 See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (police commented within

hearing of accused how horrible it would be if neighborhood child who accidently found
murder weapon was injured); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987) (police recorded
conversation between accused and his wife); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)

(accused in custody not told that his lawyer had tried to reach him); Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387 (1977) (knowing that the accused was very religious, police commented to

him how the victim deserved a "Christian burial" to get accused to take them to the
body).
35 Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 488 (1990).
36 Id.
37 Id.

38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 82 (Miss. 1988).
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The two men drove Thomas' truck to New Orleans where they
abandoned it. 4

I

They then fled to Mexico where the two men

fought, resulting in Minnick proceeding alone to Lemon Grove, California where he was arrested on Friday, August 22, 1986 and held
in a San Diego jail.

42

The day after his arrest, two FBI agents came to interview Minnick. 4 3 Minnick was told by his jailers after he refused to talk to the
44
agents that he would "have to go down [to the interview] or else."
During this interrogation Minnick refused to sign a waiver of rights
statement 4 5 which read:
I have read this statement of my rights and understand what my rights
are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not
want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing.
No promises or threats have been made to me46and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

The FBI report of the interview says that Minnick was read his Miranda rights and that he acknowledged and understood those
rights. 4 7 Minnick did discuss with the agents the jail break and the
flight to Mexico. 48 However, when questioned about the two
murders, Minnick refused to answer and invoked his right to have
counsel present.4 9 According to the report, "Minnick stated 'Come
back Monday when I have a lawyer,' and stated that he would make a
more complete statement then with his lawyer present." 50 The interview then ended. 51
An attorney was later appointed to represent Minnick. Minnick
spoke with his attorney two or three times, although the record is
unclear as to whether these conversations were in person or by telephone. 5 2 Minnick's attorney told him not to answer any questions
53
or sign any statements.
The San Diego police informed Deputy SheriffJ.C. Denham of
Clarke County, Mississippi of Minnick's arrest. Denham interviewed
41 Minnick,
42 Id.

Ill S. Ct. at 488.

43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Brief for

Petitioner at 23, Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990) (No. 896332) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
47 Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488.
48 Id.
49 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 22.
50 Minnick, 11I S.Ct. at 488.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Minnick

v. State, 551 So. 2d 77,'83 n.1 (Miss. 1988).
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Minnick in San Diego on Monday, August 25, 1986. 5 4 Again, the

police informed Minnick that he "could not refuse" to be interviewed by Denham. 55 The police further told Minnick that his law56
yer "wasn't nothing" and that he "had to talk."
Despite the fact that Minnick already had an attorney, Denham
read Minnick his Mirandarights before interrogating him. 57 Minnick
still refused to sign the waiver of rights statement or discuss the
murders. 58 However, Denham and Minnick did discuss how Minnick's family and friends were back in Clarke County and the jail
escape. 59 According to Denham, Minnick then proceeded to confess to the events at the Thomas trailer.6 0 Mississippi's case for capital murder focused on Minnick's confession. 6' The trial court
denied Minnick's motions to suppress his statements to Denham,
but suppressed his statements to the FBI. 62 Minnick was convicted
and appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court on the grounds that
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. 63 In rejecting the Fifth Amendment claim the Mississippi Supreme Court
held:
While it is true Minnick invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel,
it is also true, by his own admission, that Minnick was provided an
attorney who advised him not to speak to anyone else about any
charges against him. In this kind of situation, the Edwards bright-line
rule as to initiation does not apply. The key phrase in Edwards which
64
applies here is "until counsel has been made available to him."
The court also dismissed as meritless Minnick's Sixth Amendment
claim that his right to counsel under Mississippi law had attached by
54 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 22.

55 Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488-89.
56 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 22.
57 Id
58 Id. at 22-23.
59 Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 23. The content of Minnick's statement was
included in the Joint Appendix (32-33) as follows:
Minnick advised Dyess told him he knew the trailer had some guns in it. Minnick
advised they entered the trailer and found some guns and started collecting them
up when they heard a vehicle drive up in the yard of the trailer. Minnick advised the
two men and a small child stayed out in the yard for a few minutes. Minnick advised
when they started toward the trailer Dyess jumped out the trailer door with a shotgun. At this point Minnick advised Dyess shot one of the men in the back with a
shotgun and then in the head with a pistol. After doing this Dyess gave Minnick the
pistol and made him shoot the other man while Dyess held a shotgun to Minnick's
head.
61 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 23.
62 Minnick, I11 S. Ct. at 489.
63 Id.
64 555 So. 2d 77, 83 (Miss. 1988) (footnote omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981)).
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the time of the Denham interview and that he had not waived that
right. 6 5 The court held that because Minnick knew he had the right
to have counsel present during Denham's reinterrogation and had
already spoken with counsel, he waived his Sixth Amendment
66
rights.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the issue of whether Edwards protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination ceases once the suspect has con67
sulted with an attorney.
IV.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

In a 6-2 decision the Supreme Court reversed the Mississippi
Supreme Court. The Court decided that the Fifth Amendment protection of Edwards prohibiting authorities from initiating questioning of the accused in counsel's absence is not terminated or
suspended when an accused has consulted with an attorney prior to
questioning. 68 The Court did not address Minnick's Sixth Amend69
ment claims.
MAJORITY OPINION

A.

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and was
joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and
O'Connor. The Court started its opinion by emphasizing the merits
of its decisions in Miranda and Edwards.70 First, the Court concluded
that the Edwards rule is "designed to prevent police from badgering
T
a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights."'
Second, the Edwards holding conserves judicial resources by implementing Miranda in a "straightforward" manner. 72 Third and most
significant to the Court, the Edwards decision increases certainty in
65 Id. at 85.
66 Id.

67
68
69
70

Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 489.
Id.
Id.

Id. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court held that interrogation "must cease until an
attorney is present" and that an accused has a right to have an attorney "present during
any subsequent questioning." 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). See supra text accompanying
notes 17-28. In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court stated, "when an accused has invoked his
right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right
cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation." 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 2932.
71 Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 489 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey,
10 S.Ct. 1176, 1180
(1990)).
72 Id. at 489-90.
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the application of substantive rights by providing "clear and unequivocal" guidance to police, prosecutors and courts. 73 The Court
concluded that these benefits of Edwards outweigh the burdens Miranda imposes on law enforcement officials by requiring the suppres74
sion of probative evidence under certain circumstances.
The Court also discussed the misinterpretation of Edwards by
the Mississippi Supreme Court. The state court focused on the
statement in Edwards that an accused "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to
him. . . ."75 However, the Court placed this phrase, isolated by the
Mississippi court, back into context and stated that "a fair reading of
Edwards and subsequent cases" shows that the rule prohibits policeinitiated interrogation "unless the accused has counsel with him at
the time of questioning. ' 76 Based on their reading of Edwards, the
Court directly held that "when counsel is requested, interrogation
must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without
counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his
' 77
attorney.,
The Court rejected the respondent's proposed exception to Edwards that would remove protection from police-initiated interrogations if an accused has previously consulted with an attorney.7 8 The
Court reasoned that Minnick's "isolated consultations" with counsel
did not protect him from the "coercive pressures that accompany
custody and that may increase as custody is prolonged." 79 The
Court also believed that consultations with counsel may "not always
[be] effective in instructing the suspect of his rights." 8 0 Minnick
may have mistakenly believed that his statements were protected
since he did not sign the waiver form.8 1 The proposed exception,
that would substitute consultation with counsel for having counsel
present during questioning is "inconsistent" with Miranda, according to the Court.8 2 In Miranda, the Court stated that "[e]ven preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly
overcome by the secret interrogation process." 8 3 Through its deciIdt at 490.
Id
75 Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 83 (1988) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 484-85 (1981)).
76 Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 491.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
73
74

80 Id.
81 Id.
82
83

Id.
384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).
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sion in Minnick, the Court reaffirmed the Miranda protections of an
accused in custody.
The Court also concluded that the respondent's proposed exception would undermine the "clear and unequivocal character" of
the Edwards rule.8 4 Under the proposed exception, Edwards protec-

tion would terminate once counsel has consulted with the suspect 85
but, would resume if the suspect again requested counsel.8 6 Thus,
Edwards protection could "pass in and out of existence multiple
times." 8 7 The Court stated the proposed exception would "spread
confusion through the justice system" and would "detract from the
efficacy of the [Edwards] rule."8 8
Finally, the Court stated that this decision "does not foreclose
finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment protections."8 9 If an accused
reinitiates discussion with authorities, even after counsel has been
requested, a valid voluntary waiver may exist.90 However, the Court
stressed that in Minnick "[t]here can be no doubt that the interrogation in question was initiated by the police" and that petitioner was
"compelled to attend." 9 1 Therefore, Minnick did not validly waive
his Miranda and Edwards protections and his statement to Denham
was not admissible at trial. Consequently, the Court reversed Minnick's conviction.
B.

DISSENTING OPINION

In dissent Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, believed the Court established an "irrebuttable presumption" that a
suspect can never validly waive his Miranda right to counsel after already invoking them. 92 Justice Scalia contended that the Constitu93
tion does not call for this expansion of the Edwards rule.
According to Justice Scalia, the Court's ruling that Minnick's confession must be suppressed as a "systemic assurance" 94 against the
pressures of custody is an unauthorized "incursion upon state practices" since the suppression is not based on constitutionally recog84 Minnick, I 11 S. Ct. at 492.
85 Id. at 490.
86 Id. at 492.
87

Id.

88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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nized principles, such as compulsion or ignorance of rights. 95

Justice Scalia next distinguished the rules of Miranda and Edwards from the Court's decision in this case. Miranda recognized
that an accused could knowingly and intelligently waive his right to
counsel and expressly adopted "the high standard of proof for the
97
waiver of constitutional rights" 9 6 articulated in Johnson v. Zerbst.
While the same waiver standard used for constitutional rights applies to Miranda rights, 9 8 Justice Scalia argued that the Court should
not "impos[e] on the States a higher standard for the waiver of Miranda rights." 9 9 Previous Court decisions have rejected a rule that
waivers of Miranda rights must be deemed involuntary unless expressly stated as waived by the suspect.1 0 0 Justice Scalia believed
that the Edwards holding - that police-initiated questioning after a
suspect has requested counsel, but before counsel had been provided, was per se involuntary - "stands as a solitary exception to
our waiver jurisprudence."10 1 While Justice Scalia recognized its
merits pointed out by the Court, he stated that the Edwards rule
"must be assessed not only on the basis of what is gained, but also
on the basis of what is lost. 10° 2 The Court's expansion of Edwards
in this case creates greater losses than gains for the criminal justice
system and society, according to Justice Scalia.1 03 The desirable
consequences of the Court's decision, such as conservation ofjudicial resources, clear guidance to courts, and greater assurance
against coercion are outweighed by the State's paramount "need for
police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal
laws."

104

According to Justice Scalia, the importance of the Miranda-created right to counsel is not questioned in this case, but rather the
case addresses whether the State should not be given a chance to
95
96

Id. at 494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).

97 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
98 In Michigan v. Tucker, the Court held that Miranda rights are "not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution but... instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected." 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
99 Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 494-95. See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (waivers of

Mirandarights are not to be deemed involuntary absent an explicit assertion of waiver by
suspect); Fare v. Michael, 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (waivers of Miranda rights byjuveniles are
not per se involuntary).
101 Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 Id

103 Id.
104 Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)).
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prove under Zerbst that such a right was waived.' 0 5 The Court defines too broadly the "certain circumstances" in which waiver will be
presumed involuntary. 10 6 The only legitimate circumstances, according to Justice Scalia, would be the same situation as found in
Edwards itself.'0 7 Stressing the second part of the Zerbst standard,
that the suspect must "intelligently" waive his rights, Justice Scalia
would draw the "bright-line" rule at the time a suspect speaks with
counsel. 10 8 After a consultation with an attorney the suspect has a
"heightened awareness" of his rights and the Edwards exclusionary
rule should cease to apply.10 9 Justice Scalia maintained that if during post-consultation the police threaten or coerce a suspect into
confessing, the Zerbst standard of "voluntarily and knowingly" will
protect the suspect's rights and result in the suppression of any co0 This "clear and simple"
erced confession. 1"
rule would have all the
advantages of the Court's expansion of Edwards, but would not
harshly constrict law enforcement efforts during criminal
investigations. I 1I
Finally, Justice Scalia philosophized that to allow an honest confession to be viewed as a mistake that should be suppressed is detrimental both to the suspect and society."i 2 In Justice Scalia's
opinion, a confession to a crime "advances the goals of both 'justice
and rehabilitation' " and the Court's "misguided" decision abandons these principles.' "3
V.

ANALYSIS

The opinions in Minnick demonstrate the different views the
Justices hold regarding both the practical realities of custodial interrogation and the theoretical justifications for protection of suspects
and society. These divergent viewpoints have led the Court away
from the bright-line rules of Miranda and Edwards into a chaotic
case-by-case analysis of Miranda rights issues. This type of ad hoc
reasoning has weakened and limited the rights of suspects in custo105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. Justice Scalia would even limit that circumstance, viewing Edwards as a "past
mistake." Id. at 497.
108 Id. at 497. "Drawing a distinction between police-initiated inquiry before consultation with counsel and police-initiated inquiry after consultation with counsel is assuredly
more reasonable than other distinctions ......
Id.
109 Id. at 496.
110 Id.

I

Id.

112 Id. at 498.
113 Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n.23 (1974)).
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dial custody. Thus, much of the Court's recent caselaw has rendered Miranda almost meaningless.
Although appearing to strengthen Miranda and Edwards, Minnick is still just another case in the Court's chaotic case-by-case approach to suspect rights questions. Minnick's holding is limited to its
factual situation and thus, will have little impact on the redrawing of
Miranda's bright-line. Also, the Court in Minnick returns the emphasis to the suspect's state of mind when making a waiver, much like
the pre-Miranda voluntariness test, instead of focusing on the conduct of officials. Thus, coercive practices are not diminished by
Minnick's holding. Finally, Minnick's holding does not address the
major problems of Miranda - the correct definition and application
of the Zerbst waiver standard and the police having to inform suspects of their rights.
This Note argues that the Court should address the many
problems left by the Miranda caselaw, including Minnick, by making
custodial confessions inadmissible unless made in the presence of
an attorney. After analyzing how the rule solves the problems of the
custodial confession caselaw and refuting criticism of the rule, this
Note concludes that such a rule best solves the problems created by
the Court's ad hoc treatment of custodial confessions.
A.

THE COURT'S GRADUAL BLURRING OF MIRANDA 'S BRIGHT-LINE

One of the principle goals of the Miranda and Edwards Courts
was to provide clear guidance to police and lower courts as to what
tactics constitute coercion rendering confessions inadmissible.
However, the bright-line of these decisions has been blurred. The
Court has allowed admissions of statements for purposes of im14
peachment when Miranda warnings were not given to the suspect,'
incriminating statements made after police discuss the case within
hearing of a suspect as long as police can claim they did not reasonably expect to elicit such statements,1 1 5 and statements regarding
more serious crimes after the suspect has only waived his right to
silence for questioning about a lesser offense. 1 6 The suspect's right
to silence does not bar further interrogation as long as police
" 'scrupulously honor[ I' " the suspect's rights before they resume
questioning. 1 7 Also, police are allowed to "cure" a confession by
giving the Miranda warnings after an initial answer by a suspect,
114
115
116
117

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
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then asking him to repeat his statement. 1 18 The Court also has
weakened the Miranda rule by allowing for a public safety
exception.' 19
The Court has also created loopholes in the Miranda decision
by tampering with the definition of "custody" itself. On one hand,
the Court has held that several officers questioning a suspect in his
bedroom at 4:00 a.m. was custodial interrogation. 20 Later, the
Court declared that questioning by several IRS agents of a defendant at his home did not constitute "custody" requiring the procedures of Miranda.12 1 However, an interview by an IRS agent of a
22
defendant in jail on unrelated charges was deemed custodial.'
Also, the Court's inconsistency is shown by its decision that an ordered psychiatric examination of a defendant while in jail is custo12 4
dial,1 23 even though an ordered appearance before a grand jury
and a required meeting with probation officer 25 do not constitute
custody.
This type of erosion of Miranda's goal of protecting suspects
from police overreaching also extends to the issue of validity of
waivers. The Miranda Court applied the Zerbst standard of knowing
and intelligent waiver to a suspect's waiver of the right of silence
and the right to counsel. However, the Court has recently lessened
the burden on the police to prove valid waivers of these rights. In
Colorado v. Connelly, 12 6 for example, the Court ruled the defendant
validly waived his rights despite the testimony of an examining psychiatrist that the defendant suffered from "command hallucina12 7
tions" and was unable "to make free and rationale choices."'
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist apparently reasoned that
if there was no police coercion then there was no violation of the
suspect's rights and a valid waiver occurred. There is no indication
that the Zerbst standard of waiver was even considered. The Court
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
119 Statements made by a suspect will be admissible despite the suspect not being
read his Miranda rights if there is some public danger present. New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649 (1984). In Quarles, the defendant was arrested and handcuffed by several police
in a convenience store late at night and was not read his rights even though there was
only negligible danger to the public. In fact, the police tactics involved in Quarles probably would have been ruled coercive under pre-Miranda tests.
120 Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
121 Beckworth v. U.S., 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
122 Mathis v. U.S., 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
123 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
124 U.S. v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
125 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
126 107 S.Ct. 515 (1986).
127 Id. at 526. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118
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had ignored the Zerbst standard earlier in Lego v. Twomey, 128 when it
declared that the voluntariness of a confession can be established by
a preponderance of the evidence.
As two commentators note, the Court's insistence that Miranda
is good law along with its willingness to render decisions that reduce
Miranda's significance is a "dishonest approach that can breed only
129
disrespect for the law."
B.

THE MINNICKJUSTICES DISAGREEMENT: THE ECHOING OF

MIRANDA 'S DIFFERING PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

If its recent decisions so undermine the goals of Miranda, why
does the Court not realize this erosion of rights? Why has the Rehnquist Court continued to vacillate on suspect rights questions under
an ad hoc case-by-case analysis despite the ruling of Miranda? Why
has Miranda's per se holding been replaced with numerous exceptions to the Miranda rights? The answer lies in the practical and
theoretical differences between liberal and conservative members of
the Court. The opinions in Minnick v. Mississippi illustrate these differing viewpoints.
In Minnick, the Justices revealed different opinions of what really happens during custodial interrogation. Justice Kennedy
stressed the vulnerability of a suspect in custody and the need for
the Court to insure suspects' rights:
A single consultation with an attorney does not remove the suspect
from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his
rights, or from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and that
may increase as custody is prolonged. The case before us well illustrates the
pressures, and abuses, that may be concomitants of
30
custody.1

The majority recognized that police have a duty to try to make suspects talk. As one commentator notes, "[t]o induce a confession, an
act that ordinarily runs against inclination and interest, [an interrogator] manipulates and deceives the suspect."' 13 1 The majority is
not naive to the problems created by requiring police to inform suspects of their rights and protect those rights. As Professor Kamisar
128 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
129 Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposalforthe Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 98 (1989) (proposing aperse rule that "out-of-court
statements made by defendants while in custody, whether or not the result of interrogation, cannot be used to establish guilt in criminal trials."). Id. at 75.
130 Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 491.
131 Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1458 (1985) (footnote omitted).
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stated "when we expect police dutifully" to inform suspects of their
rights, "we demand too much of even our best officers."' 132 The
Court, therefore, views the realities of interrogation behind the stationhouse door with due skepticism since police conduct over the
13 3
years may hardly be said to have inspired judicial confidence.
In contrast, Justice Scalia based his dissent in Minnick on an underlying belief that police conduct during custodial confessions is
not as harsh and abusive as the Court contended. Justice Scalia
stated:
[T]he Edwards rule rests upon an assumption similar to that of Miranda
itself: that when a suspect in police custody is first questioned he is
likely to be ignorant of his rights and to feel isolated in a hostile environment . . . After a suspect has seen his request for an attorney

honored, however, and has actually spoken with that attorney... the
suspect then knows that he has an advocate on his side, and that the
police will permit him to consult that advocate. He almost certainly
also has a heightened awareness . . . of his right[s]. .. 134
This view suggests that the dissent was unsympathetic to the
claimed inherent pressures of custodial interrogation and Miranda's
express warning that "[e]ven preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process."' 135 Justice Scalia also apparently believed that
feelings of guilt motivate confessions more than custodial coercion
by the police.
The opinions in Minnick thus reflect the attitudes of the majority and dissent in Miranda in the way the Justices differ on the realities of custodial interrogation. For the majority in Miranda,Justice
Warren referring to several police manuals on interrogation tactics
concluded, "[t]hese tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the
police purport to know already - that he is guilty. Explanations to
the contrary are dismissed and discouraged."'' 36 Dissenting, Justice
Harlan referred to police tactics as "minor pressures and disadvantages intrinsic to any kind of police interrogation" that are merely
"inconvenient and unpleasant for the suspect."' 137 Under these
practical differences regarding custodial interrogation lay funda132 Yale Kamisar, EqualJustice in the Gatehouse and Mansions of American CriminalProcedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 35-36 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965).
133 Caplan, supra note 131. See also, cases cited supra note 34.
134 Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 495-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).
136 Id. at 450.
137 Id. at 516-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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mental theoretical differences between the majority and dissents evidenced by both Miranda and Minnick.
As Chief Justice Warren explained in Miranda, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a govern38
ment.., must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."'
Therefore, to the Miranda Court, any compulsion was improper because it did not comport with human dignity.' 3 9 ChiefJustice Warren continued that the custodial environment "carries its own badge
of intimidation" that is as "equally destructive of human dignity" as
physical abuse. 140 The Minnick Court echoes this theory by refusing
to remove Edwards protection when a suspect has consulted with an
attorney, but did not have counsel present during interrogation.
Removal of protection, which then might "pass in and out" would
lead to a ' "loss
of respect for the underlying constitutional
principle[s]. ' 14 1
In Miranda and Minnick, the dissents primarily based their opinions on the need for strong law enforcement to protect society and
the morality of confessions. In Miranda Justice Harlan stated,
"[s]ociety has always paid a stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark moments of the law." 14 2 Justice White emphasized the view that there is "nothing wrong or
immoral" in police interrogation of suspects, even if subtly coercive.1 43 In Minnick, Justice Scalia stated that confessions are beneficial "[n]ot only for society, but for the wrongdoer himself,
admission of guilt... if not coerced, is inherently desirable, because
it advances the goals of both justice and rehabilitation."144 He concluded that "[t]o design our laws on premises contrary to these is to
abandon belief in . . . the moral claim of just government to
obedience."145
C.

MINNICK'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF
MIRANDA

Minnick v. Mississippi is a piece of the Miranda puzzle. Although
the Court in Minnick attempted to add another brick into the wall of
protection provided by Miranda and Edwards, its temporary bit of
138 Id. at 460.

139 Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 129, at 77 (footnote omitted).
140 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
141 Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 492 (1990).
142 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
144 Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
145 Id.
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construction in a world of turbulent decisions fails to guarantee stability for suspects' rights. Minnick is indeed a creature of Miranda
it has its reasoning and its problems.
As discussed previously, the goals of Miranda were to protect
suspects from police abuse and coercion, to provide clear guidelines
for police and lower courts regarding the admissibility of confessions and the validity of waivers, and finally, as a result of its per se
rule, conserve judicial resources that had been used in making caseby-case determinations under the voluntariness test. Both proponents and opponents of the Miranda ruling agree that these goals
have not been met. 14 6 As evidenced by the Court's inconsistent
treatment of the Miranda line of cases, the per se presumptions of
Miranda have given way in large part to a resurrected case-by-case
analysis and a reemphasis on the voluntary nature of the confession
instead of on police tactics. Several loopholes left by the Miranda
Court, such as the definition of custody and the correct application
and definitions of the Zerbst waiver standard, not only remain today
but have become sinkholes which may completely swallow Miranda.
Finally, the requirement that police be given the conflicting duties
of both informing the suspect of his rights and of trying to make him
give up those rights is problematic by its very nature.
In Minnick, the Court tried to prop up the falling Miranda and
Edwards rules to again protect the rights of an accused and provide
clear guidance to police and courts. The Minnick Court refused to
limit the Edwards rule that police must stop interrogation when a
suspect invokes his right to counsel. The Court strengthened the
Edwards rule by holding that, not only must interrogation cease
upon request for counsel, but "officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney."' 47 Further, the Court "insist[ed] that
neither admissions nor waivers are effective unless there are both
particular and systemic assurances that the coercive pressures of
custody were not the inducing cause."' 4 8 This holding creates a
presumption that confessions are inadmissible unless police implement certain protective procedures. Minnick also goes further than
Miranda and Edwards by expressly requiring an attorney's presence
to commence reinterrogation. The Court's decision seems to pro146 See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 129; Stuntz, supra note 31, at 820-21;
Schuihofer, supra note 17; Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Ques-

tioning: A Response to "Reconsidering M'iranda," 54 U. Chi. L.Rev. 938, 949 (1987); Ogle-

tree, supra note 8, at 1827.
147 Minnick, I11 S. Ct. at 491.
148 Id. at 492.
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vide a clear guideline for police and courts to follow while at the
same time protecting suspects from police coercion. Even the most
notorious police interrogator will hesitate before engaging in overreaching coercive tactics when the suspect's attorney is in the room.
Also, courts will not have to delve into the contents of consultations
between attorneys and clients in order to determine if the suspect
had enough information to "knowingly and intelligently" waive his
rights. This not only conserves judicial resources, but also avoids
attorney-client privilege problems as the Court points out. 14 9

Although the Court's decision in Minnick does not, as do several
recent decisions, erode the protections guaranteed suspects in Miranda and Edwards, it fails to provide a solid solution to the many
problems of Miranda caselaw. While expressly calling for the presence of counsel in order for the police to reinitiate interrogation,
the Minnick holding excepts from this protection instances where
the accused has reinitiated discussions with police. This suspect
reinitiation exception does nothing to address the Court's primary
problems since Miranda: When do police tactics become coercion?
And when is a waiver valid?
Deciding if the suspect was coerced into reinitiating discussions
with police will often be very difficult. Not all coercive tactics will be
as blatant as the police telling Minnick that his lawyer was "nothing"
and that he "had to talk." 15 0 The Court will have to engage in a
case-by-case analysis of what went on behind the stationhouse door,
which will often be impossible to completely determine. This inability to determine whether the suspect was coerced into reinitiating
talks with the police makes impossible the determination of whether
that reinitiation counts as a valid waiver under the Zerbst "knowingly
and intelligently waived" standard.
Also, both the majority and dissent in Minnick engaged in a balancing of the suspect's rights and the need for police questioning in
criminal investigations, despite Miranda's explicit rejection of any
balancing tests. The majority and dissent obviously gave different
weight to the factors to be balanced. The majority's emphasis on
the vulnerable suspect in the inherently coercive atmosphere of custody is completely contrary to the dissent's vision of the "heightened awareness" of suspects who have been read their rights and
have consulted with counsel. These different views indicate the split
in the Court as to the correct "realities" and philosophies of custodial interrogation. Such a split of opinion diminishes clear guideId.
150 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 22.
149
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lines sent by the Court to police and lower courts because which
viewpoint will prevail in any given case is unclear. The Court's
swinging from one perspective to the other in its case-by-case analysis will only increase as new Justices Souter and Thomas enter the
debate.
The problems created by the Court's reluctance to follow the
per se rules of Miranda, Edwards and possibly in the future, Minnick
are great. The caselaw dealing with suspects' rights is as confusing
today as it was before Miranda. Police do not have "clear and unequivocal" guidelines to follow. In fact, the Court's decisions may
have encouraged police to adopt procedures in the gray area between compulsion and investigation, since it is unclear what will be
allowed. The loopholes allowing waivers of the right to counsel and
right of silence result in the Court having to determine the validity
of those waivers on a case-by-case "totality of circumstances" basis.
The Zerbst standard that waivers must be knowingly and intelligently
waived is easily manipulated depending on the practical and theoretical viewpoints of the members of the majority in any given case.
Therefore, a more comprehensive approach to the problems of
Miranda and the cases that are its legacy is necessary to fully protect
the constitutional rights of suspects during custodial interrogation.
Minnick is a step in the right direction, but what is needed is a leap
toward absolute protection of suspects' rights under the
Constitution.
VI.

A

PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE INADMISSIBILITY OF CUSTODIAL

CONFESSIONS UNLESS MADE IN THE PRESENCE OF AN
ATTORNEY
A.

THE PROBLEMS OF CUSTODIAL CONFESSIONS

Several solutions for the problems in the current law of custodial confessions have been proposed over the years. A few of these
procedures are simply technical cures' 5 ' not really getting at the issue - the need to protect suspects from coercive pressures to
speak, while still allowing truly voluntary confessions to be given.
Other proposals attempt to restructure the legal process to provide
151 These cures include giving suspects a cooling off period in which to rethink their
decision to either confess or remain silent, allowing neutral observers from the community to be present during interrogations, and more strictly enforcing prompt arraignment statutes. See generally, Caplan, supra note 131, at 1464, 1474. These proposed
solutions cannot seriously impact on the underlying problems of custodial confessions
because they fail to protect suspects from coercion during the cooling off period or
before arraignment and because neutral observers will not know if suspects are correctly
informed of their rights.
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more adequate protection while providing for admission of truly
voluntary confessions to be admissible. 15 2 Finally, more radical solutions have been proposed, such as making the right to counsel
non-waivable1 5 3 and excluding all custodial confessions made under
any circumstance. 15 4 None of these proposals satisfactorily address
the problems left by the chaotic caselaw following Miranda.
This Note's proposed solution to the problems currently faced
in the area of custodial confessions is to make any confession made
to police outside the presence of an attorney per se inadmissible. As
the Court in Minnick emphasized, it is the presence of counsel that is
the important feature of Edwards.155 By making only statements
made to police with assistance of counsel admissible the goals of
Miranda are best protected.
First, this rule eliminates police abuse of suspects and use of
overreaching coercive tactics. Police will have no incentive to convince suspects to incriminate themselves because unless an attorney
is present when the confession is offered it is inadmissible. This also
eliminates the problems of determining when a suspect reinitiates
discussions with police free from coercion and whether that reinitiation constitutes a valid waiver of rights under Zerbst. The rule still
requires the presence of an attorney during suspect-initiated interrogation in order for any statements made by the suspect to be admissible in court.
Second, this rule fulfills the goal of having suspects adequately
informed of their rights. No longer do the courts have to guess as to
152 One such proposed solution includes creating a higher burden of proof for the
admission of custodial confessions. See id. at 1474. However, the Court has already applied the highest standard, the Zerbst standard, to police wishing to admit custodial confessions. Yet, these standards will always be ill-defined, debatable and manipulable in a
case-by-case analysis. Another legally-based proposal is to add teeth to the old voluntariness test by having per se rules prohibiting certain practices, such as relay interrogations. This proposal still leaves unanswered the question of whether the police have
violated the prohibitive rule.
153 This proposal too greatly restricts confessions by not allowing a suspect who understands his rights, but truly wants to relieve his conscious and face his punishment
through confession of his crimes, to do so without considerable waste of time and judicial resources.
154 See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 129. Under this most radical solution,
truly guilty defendants would have to wait until arraignment to plead guilty. Although
this would reduce police coercion to confess, it would slow investigations of criminal
activity to an unacceptable level since almost all questioning of suspects would cease.
Also, this solution would waste judicial resources.
155 "Edwards' purpose [is] to protect the suspect's right to have counsel present at custodial interrogation." Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 491 (1990) (emphasis added). See also, Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291 (1988) ("Preserving the integrity
of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel is the essence
of Edwards ..
").
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whether the suspect really understood the warnings read to him by
the police. With an attorney present to explain at length, if necessary, an accused's constitutional rights and to make sure that those
rights are truly "knowingly and intelligently" waived, the validity of
waivers no longer poses a manipulable loophole for the police and
courts to use to run around the Constitution. The rule presumes
that the suspect was adequately informed of his rights by counsel
and then in the presence of counsel "knowingly and intelligently"
waives his rights and confesses to police. Counsel's presence at the
confession stage is critical because he can continue to clarify the suspect's understanding of his rights throughout the questioning
period.
Finally, this rule gives the clear and unequivocal guidance to
police and courts that the Miranda Court so strived for, yet without
the loopholes associated with case-by-case analysis. Police have no
incentive to coerce suspects, either with subtle tricks or blatant
physical abuse, because no statement made by the suspect under
such circumstances are admissible. Also, the attorney's presence as
a requirement of admissibility is straightforward and unmanipulable
by the courts. Such clear guidelines, therefore, conserve judicial resources. Courts are freed from collateral Miranda issues, such as the
validity of waivers, and able to spend more time addressing other
issues on their overcrowded dockets.
B.

RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS OF THIS RULE

As with any rule, this rule requiring the presence of counsel in
order for a suspect's statement to be admissible is not without criticism. The three major criticisms of this rule are: (1) it will eliminate
all confessions - both voluntary and coerced; (2) the presence of
counsel does not presumptively mean the suspect will be adequately
informed of his rights and will "knowingly and intelligently" be able
to waive them; and (3) it will be impractical, if not impossible, to
implement. These criticisms can be effectively refuted, thereby securing the rule as a valid alternative to the present law of custodial
confessions.
Many scholars view the presence of counsel as preventing any
and all confessions to the police. t 56 In 1986, the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERROGATION REPORT condemned a requirement of the
156 See, Fred E. Inbau & James P. Manak, Miranda v. Arizona - Is it Worth the Cost?, 21
THE PROSECUTOR 31, 35 (No. 4 1988) ("Once a lawyer enters upon an interrogation
scene, he will very rarely do anything more than instruct his client to keep his mouth
shut.").
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presence of counsel at custodial interrogations, stating "any value of
a right to counsel in establishing voluntariness must be weighed
against the costs of recognizing such a right ... If a lawyer appears,
he will usually tell his client to say nothing to law enforcement officers, and there will be little point in attempting further questioning." 15 7 Although this rule will probably reduce the number of
confessions, that is in fact its goal. Coerced confessions will be less
likely to happen in the presence of counsel, thereby only leaving
truly voluntary admissions to be used in court against the suspect.
At the same time, this rule agrees with Justice Scalia's belief that it is
"virtuous for the wrongdoer to admit his offense and accept the
punishment he deserves." 1 5 8 A suspect who is indeed willing to
"admit his offense and accept the punishment he deserves" will reject his attorney's advice not to say anything to police, and fully understanding that he has the right to remain silent, will confess his
illegal actions and clear his conscious.' 59 Since this rule does not
create an "irrebuttable presumption that a criminal suspect... can
never validly waive" his rights, 160 all confessions will not be eliminated, merely those that are not completely freely given in the presence of counsel.
Scholars Irene and Yale Rosenberg, who propose the most radical rule, making all custodial confessions inadmissible, would criticize the rule's presumption that the presence of an attorney will
result in the suspect being fully informed of his rights.' 6 1 They believe that "given the stress and time pressures of stationhouse questioning, mistakes injudgement, such as erroneous advice to give an
exonerating statement, are more likely to occur."' 6 2 However, this
criticism's weakness is that no attorney, whether a public defender,
prosecutor, or private sector business lawyer is not without pressure-filled busy work days. Yet they are all, for the most part, able
to give competent advice during hectic times. As the Court has
stated, "any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect... to make no
statement to police under any circumstances."'1 63 Furthermore, the
police are now in the position of informing suspects of their rights.
The likelihood of counsel giving the suspect more erroneous advice
157 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY

111 (Feb. 12, 1986, with addendum
ofJan. 20, 1987).
158 Minnick, III S. Ct. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159 Id.
GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION

160
161
162
163

Id. at 492.
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 129, at 104.
Id. at 105 (footnote omitted).
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part).
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than they currently receive from police is extremely small. The presumption remains that most lawyers will adequately inform the suspect of their rights, strengthening the validity of any waiver of those
rights.
A third criticism of such a rule is that it is impractical - that
public defenders are already overworked, that it would cost an unreasonable amount of money and that there are times when it is impossible to get an attorney to the stationhouse. Granted, public
defenders are already overburdened, however this rule does not
need to add to their burdens. Other attorneys, or even law students
with 7-11 licenses, could sit in on the questioning of the suspect.
This could also be done on a voluntary, pro bono basis, thereby
keeping extra costs at a minimum. And finally, it is irrelevant that
an attorney may not be able to be present during the initial questioning of a suspect. According to the rule, the police cannot use
any confession made by a suspect against that person in court unless
counsel was present when the statement was made. Initial questioning can therefore be postponed until an attorney is available. And,
in cases where immediate questioning is necessary to stop an ongoing or to prevent an impending crime, police could question the witness after fully informing him of his rights. If the witness confesses
at that time, he may repeat his confession in the presence of counsel. This still protects the suspect from coercion, since police will
not coerce a suspect to get an initial inadmissible statement if they
know he will refuse to make it later when fully informed of his rights
and in the protective presence of counsel.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Though the Court's decision in Minnick v. Mississippi correctly
protects suspects' rights, it suffers from faulty reasoning and fails to
address the major problems in the area of custodial confessions.
The Court's treatment of Fifth Amendment rights issues under a
weakened version of Miranda v. Arizona is unpredictable, causing
confusion where there should be "clear and unequivocal
guidelines."
The proposal to make all custodial confessions inadmissible unless made in the presence of counsel is supported by the Court's
decisions in Miranda, Edwards and Minnick. Yet those cases do not
go far enough and the Court's recent weakening of them has prevented Miranda's goal from being achieved. The rule proposed here
achieves those goals; it ensures that suspects will be adequately informed of their rights and that they will not be coerced into confess-
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ing by the police. Therefore under this rule, any confessions made
and admitted in court will involve an intelligent and knowing waiver
of Fifth Amendment rights freely given by the accused.
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